

THE INTERACTIONAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF COMMUNITY REVISITED

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I. THE PURPOSE

Planning community development requires a sound scientific and philosophical conceptualization of community focusing on the dynamics of human interaction. While a number of efforts had been made to conceptualize and define the community by sociologists from such various perspectives as ecological and structural approaches, in the early 1950's some American sociologists began to focus their attention on the dynamic interaction aspects of the community by considering social-psychological dimensions and sought to conceptualize the community in terms of community action.

In 1951, for example, Jessie Bernard wrote an article, "Social Psychological Aspects of Community," in which the author argued that sociologists should pay more attention to the dynamic aspects of the community phenomena to understand the dynamics of personal and group interaction. Similarly, Solon Kimball and Marion Pearsall (1954, 1955) were concerned with a methodology for community studies, focusing on human interactions and social events in a community setting.

It was, however, Harold F. Kaufman's 1959 paper, "Toward an Interactional Conception of Community," which attempted to take a first step in the delineation of an interactional theory of community. In this article the author stresses the importance of a conceptual framework focusing on dynamics and processes. Following this effort, Willis A. Sutton, Jr. and Jiri Kolaja (1960a, 1960b) elaborated the concept of community and community action more fully from the interactional perspective.

Among the several proponents of the interactional approach, Kimball and Pearsall, Kaufman, and Sutton and Kolaja have made the most significant contribution to the theory of community in terms of community action. The following is an analysis of these authors work to understand what the basic positions and assumptions underlying the interaction approach are. More specifically, the writer seeks to specify

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and illustrate their positions regarding the following key aspects of community:

(1) How does each of the authors conceive of or define community as an "entity"—as a social fact? This question includes the problem of how the authors specify "when" there is a community.

(2) What are specified or implied as "independent" and what as "dependent" variables. Is the community as an entity the dependent or the independent variable? Put another way, is the outcome of a particular action treated as a dependent or an independent variable?

(3) How do they conceive of the component parts of the entity they see as a community?

(4) What are community actions and how are they to be identified and differentiated from actions that are non-community in character? Does the author attempt to say what the constituents of community actions are? If so, what are these constituents?

The first two questions are the fundamental ones in the sense that the assumption of the community "entity-ness", as well as the community as either independent or dependent variable, affects the nature of the community concept, theory and method of scientific inquiry directly. It may look strange that sociologists should get involved in philosophical considerations about the nature of reality. In fact, however, the sociologist's view of reality makes a great deal of difference to his scientific approach, i.e., what things he would investigate and what method he is going to employ for the investigation (Cartwright and Zander 1960). In this connection it may be worthwhile to remember the late Kurt Lewin's statement, "Nothing is more practical than a good theory" (Ross 1955, p. xi)

While the first two questions stated above are theoretically and methodologically relevant, underlying assumptions in the study of community on an abstract level, the last two questions offer more concrete conceptual tools for the study of community from the interactional approach. By answering question three, one may understand how interactionists view the nature of community and by using all four one can find how significant the action theory is and how useful it is in the scientific investigation of community.

II. BASIC POSITIONS

A. Kimball and Pearsall

Kimball and Pearsall (1954, p. xvi) conceive of a community as "a series of interdependent systems." Conceptually, they argue, it resembles the kinship system which is an abstraction based on the kind of behavior that happens within and between members of separate family groups. However, Kimball and Pearsall suggest that community is also a system

which is more complex than a family or kinship system. Community as a system is said to be composed of all the separate systems (or groups and organizations) in a given time and space for which interrelationships can be determined.

By identifying community as a system which also consists of a number of separate but interdependent systems, Kimball and Pearsall imply that a community is a real entity. This implication is clearly found in their statement that the interdependent systems or "groups are real. They are composed of individuals in interaction with each other in certain specified and traditional ways" (1954, p. xvi). In this way, the authors seem to recognize that not only do groups, systems, and the community itself exist as real entities but also they imply that traditional ways of behavior, customs, and value systems exist in their own right.

The question of whether the community as an entity should be regarded as the independent variable or dependent variable is explored in a somewhat ambiguous manner. At the beginning of their article, "Event Analysis as an Approach to Community Study," they state, "the community system is determined, not in terms of its static characteristics, as has been the custom in the past, but through tracing out the system in terms of the presence or absence of interaction in events, and the definition of systems of interaction, associated values and customary behavior" (1955, p. 60).

Apparently, Kimball and Pearsall insist that the community system is a consequence of the presence or absence of interaction in events and the definition of interaction. However, these interactions in events are formed within the boundary of community value systems and customs. Thus on the one hand, the authors seem to imply that community is "there" when there are interactions. In this sense, community is defined and manifested by social interactions between participants. On the other hand, the pattern of each interaction is decided by the existing customs, beliefs and value system. Community, as an independent variable in the sense of shared meanings, then affects human interaction and community action.

In brief, the authors seem to conceive of community as an independent entity which determines the pattern of interactions while they emphasize the interactional approach as a method to explore the community system. This position is further clarified in their statement, "Differences in communities are functions of such variables as environment, population, technology and historical development." These are some of the general concepts with which the social scientist begins his study of species." (1954, p. 187) It can be acknowledged here that this theoretical position is somewhat similar to Kaufman's (1959) viewpoint which will be examined next.

The question raised now is what the component parts of the com-

munity are. The clue to this problem can be seen in the authors' following statement:

"A system is seen as composed of a number of *individuals* united by *ordered relations*, existing in *time and space*, each individual responding in a customary manner towards others within the system (or outsiders or events which impinge on the system), the nature of the *interaction* (ordered relations and custom) being an expression of the values affected by the situation or event which stimulated the response" (1954, p. xviii).

In this long and involved sentence, three components of the community system can be identified: (1) ordered relations based on interaction. (2) a system of customary behavior, and (3) a system of value. In this regard, Kimball and Pearsall argue that inevitably all three systems are interdependent and support and modify each other.

Seven major types of relational systems, according to the authors, may be distinguished. These are family, economic, religious, political, educational, associational, and informal (1954, p. xvi). Systems of customary behavior are found associated with each relational system. These systems are patterned and traditional. The evaluational responses are manifestations of the values held by the individual.

As viewed above, however, Kimball and Pearsall did not clarify how these elements are unique phenomena found in the community. In other words, they seem to have failed to explore the distinctiveness of the community as an entity. This problem is again found in the fourth question: What are community actions and how are they differentiated from actions that are non-community in character? Kimball and Pearsall do not explore this question. This may be derived from the fact that Kimball and Pearsall were not interested in the theory of community in terms of the interactional model. As pointed out earlier, they seem to stress the interactional approach solely for the methodological purpose to study the community.

Nevertheless, several elements by which we can differentiate between community and non-community actions may be pulled out of the authors' writings according to their implication. First of all, by their definition of community, community action consists of community-wide interactions between persons, groups and institutions in the locality. The interactional pattern may be formal or informal (1955, p. 63). Secondly, there is a collective goal in the community action. Thirdly, the pattern of interactions which is related to the collective action with a specific goal is bound by the community's unique customary behavior and values.

Finally, the community action is limited by a particular environment located in time and space. Here the authors imply that a specific local area is essential to judge the community-ness of the collective action.

This position is somewhat clarified in their statement that "there is no social system which does not contain this element (space) operating within an environment of cultural universals" (1954, p. xviii).

B. Kaufman's Theory of Community

Beginning with the statement that the need for community development requires a conceptual framework focusing on dynamics and process, Harold H. Kaufman (1959, pp. 8-9), in his paper, "Toward an Interactional Conception of Community," defines community as an "interactional field" or "arena" which consists of three elements: (1) that community is a social unit of which *space* is an integral part; (2) that community is a *way of life*, i.e., how people do things (their collective goals); and (3) that community involves *collective action* toward common concerns.

In this definition of community, for Kaufman, the key concept is the notion of field or arena and both of the terms are used interchangeably in his paper. By identifying community as a field, Kaufman seems to define community as a social entity which is to be considered real although he does not explicitly discuss this problem in the paper. The question of real "entityness" of the community as a whole can be clarified when one reviews Kurt Lewin's (1951) writing, *Field Theory in Social Science*, from which Kaufman seems to have borrowed the term "field" (Kaufman 1959, p. 10, footnote 14). Concerning the problem of reality Lewin points out in the following statement that the existence of a social entity is undeniable "The taboo against believing in the existence of a social entity is probably most effectively broken by handling this entity experimentally" (Lewin 1951, p. 193). Furthermore, Lewin (1951, p. 190) notes:

Labeling something as "nonexistent" is equivalent to declaring it "out of bounds" for the scientist. Attributing "existence" to an item automatically makes it a duty of the scientist to consider this item as an object of research; it includes the necessity of considering its properties as "facts" which cannot be neglected in the total system of theories: finally, it implies that the terms with which one refers to the item are acceptable as scientific "concepts" (rather than "mere words").

In connection with this, by conceiving of the community as an interactional field or arena he distinguishes his position from those who regard the community as a group, or anything else. Kaufman seems to feel that the community is more than a simple group or association. Thus, for Kaufman, a community is a holistic entity which consists of various groups, associations and individuals (as parts). In this way, his view of community is not greatly different from the ecological concept of community while he emphasizes the interactive aspects as important ele-

ments in the concept of community.

The problem here is the relationship between community and individuals. Does community as an entity cause human interactions or vice-versa? For this question, Kaufman seems to treat community as an independent variable and states: "One may visualize the community field as a stage with the particular ethos of the local society *determining* the players and plays" (Kaufman, 1959, p. 10, my italics). This viewpoint seems to have been the result of his effort to combine both the ecological and the interactional approaches, emphasizing ecological factors as more important. This position is clearer in the following statement:

The community field consists of an organization of actions carried on by persons working through various associations or groups. This organization of action occupies the center of the community arena and is distinguished from other fields of action in a locality by a complex of characteristics or dimensions. *Providing a setting for community action and an integral part of the arena are patterns of demographic, ecological, and physical factors* (Kaufman 1959, p. 10-11, my italics).

Apparently, for Kaufman (1959, p. 15) community action is a dependent variable and "the physical, ecological, and demographic factors would, in most designs, appear as independent variables." Again, this viewpoint of community as an independent variable and human interaction as a dependent variable is found in the Lewin's (1951) field theory which is based on the thesis that behavior is a product of a field of interdependent determinants.

The next question related to Kaufman's paper is what are the component parts of the entity that the author sees as community. As noted earlier, Kaufman identifies three elements as important: (1) a territorial space, a relatively small one, (2) a configuration of way of life (institutions and collective goals), and (3) collective action. By implication, a field is a place where collective action is taken for the achievement of collective goals. In this regard, Kaufman (1959, p. 10) differentiates a community field from "other fields such as the economic, the religious, the political."

According to Kaufman, the key concept by which a community field differs from other fields is the notion of collective action which is directed to various community goals. Then, how is the community action distinguished from those actions that are non-community in character? For this question, first of all, Kaufman characterizes the nature of any action, whether community or other, in terms of three elements. These are (1) the actors or participants, (2) the associations or groups through which the action takes place, and (3) the stage and phases of action

through time.¹

After specifying these three characteristics of action, Kaufman (1959) distinguishes community action from those of noncommunity in terms of six dimensions or criteria. The dimensions noted are (1) the degree of comprehensiveness of interests pursued and needs met, (2) the degree to which the action is identified with the locality, (3) the relative number, status, and degree of involvement of local residents, (4) the relative number and significance of local associations involved, (5) the degree to which the action maintains or changes the local society, and (6) the extent of organization of the action. Among these six criteria the notion of local interests or identification with locality seems to be the most important criterion by which one can distinguish between community and non-community actions. According to Kaufman (1959, pp. 13-14), the essential thing is that "an action be identified with the locality and that it either express a number of interests in the local life or be closely related to other actions which express such interests." If actions cover a wide range of interests of the local life, a number of significant participants and groups will be involved.

Kaufman, however, does not specify the range of interests or degree of involvement except in its relation to the locality. What Kaufman is saying is that any action in a locality would not be a community action unless it has reference to that locality. The degree of involvement, according to Kaufman, ranges all the way from those who were providing the main leadership to individuals completely unaware of the activity as far as they are either actors or beneficiaries in terms of local reference.

C. Sutton and Kolaja

Sutton and Kolaja (1960, p. 197) in their paper "The Concept of Community" gave a definition of community as "a number of families residing in a relatively small area within which they have developed a more or less complete socio-cultural system imbued with collective identification and by means of which they solve problems arising from the sharing of the area." From the interactional approach, the authors attempted to integrate conceptions of community and conceptions of community action.

In this connection, the authors distinguish between "the" community and community phenomena. According to Sutton and Kolaja, the community is defined as a social organization or structure in a somewhat similar manner to E. T. Hiller's (1941) conception of the community as a social group. The community may exist when community phenomena are observable or "identifiable". Community phenomena are conceptualized as consisting of "all those social interactions which arise from and/or embody the efforts of many or most persons and groups to

¹Space dimension is also specified in that, by his definition, community action is taken in a specific community field.

shape the major decisions and conditions constituting 'solutions' to the problems which flow from the common use of an area (Sutton and Kolaja 1960, p. 198). Thus, community phenomena were viewed by the authors as the social interactions for problem-solving of an area's population.

Sutton and Kolaja seem to imply that the community is a real entity which has emergent characteristics out of individuals' interaction processes. This implication can be seen in the following statement:

'The' community is that unit of social organization or structure which come into being when such interactions become sufficiently regularized or patterned for us to be able to say that the total complex of them comprise an identifiable entity (Sutton and Kolaja 1960, p. 198).

Thus, according to Sutton and Kolaja, a community comes into being as an entity when social interactions are regularized and patterned enough to become a social organization or structure.

The next question then is whether this community as an entity is the dependent or independent variable. According to Sutton and Kolaja, the community exists when identifiable community phenomena occur and manifest a certain pattern in a locality. For Sutton and Kolaja, the community is therefore primarily thought to be the dependent variable. The community "comes into being" when social interactions become sufficiently patterned and regularized. As far as this question is concerned, the authors' position is consistent in their writings in contrast to Kaufman's viewpoint which is somewhat ambiguous and inconsistent.²

For the third question, "What are the component parts of the community?", Sutton and Kolaja first differentiate between the concept of community and that of community phenomena. By "the" community, the authors seem to mean that the community exists as an entity which is a more or less stable social structure or system located in a local area. The authors conceptualize the community in a quite conventional way—like most other community theorists, but proceed to suggest that community phenomena or interactional relationships that may be characterized as "community-ness" should be identifiable in a locality to be "the" community. Here the authors stress on-going processes of interaction and attempt to integrate conceptions of community and conceptions of community action. Accordingly, then, the component

²In this sense, strictly speaking, Sutton and Kolaja may be the only interactional theorists since they treat human interaction as an independent variable and thus they are easily ready to observe community phenomena and human interactions, being free from the strict deterministic viewpoint that human interactions are simply directed and determined by forces other than humans themselves. Of course they do not reject the possibility that human interactions and community phenomena are also influenced by other exogenous factors.

parts of the community may be discriminated from the component parts of community

According to the definition of community provided by Sutton and Kolaja, at least four components of the community can be identified: (1) a number of residents (families), (2) living in a local area, (3) sharing a way of life (sociocultural system), and solving problems, (4) with collective identification. These elements are quite similar to those in the definition by Kaufman. In addition to this, four other major variables which are pointed out by the authors can be identified as crucial elements in their interactional model of the community phenomena.

These variables are (1) number of actors, (2) awareness of action, (3) goal of action, and (4) recipients of action. Among these four variables, (1) and (3) are considered more relevant for the degree of "community-ness" than (2) and (4). By cross-classifying the four variables and weighting them, they develop a sixteen-fold table by which the degree of "community-ness" of pertinent action can be decided in order.

Identifying these four variables as important elements in their interactional model of community theory, Sutton and Kolaja answer the fourth question, "What are community actions and how are they to be identified and differentiated from actions that are non-community in character?" In other words, for Sutton and Kolaja, a collective action, in order to be a community action, consists of a substantial number of actors with a degree of awareness and a collective goal with relatively many recipients of the action. In addition to this, the authors suggest a further qualification: community interactions should be related to a specific area. Here they emphasize the locality-related base which is at the root of the interactions of these numbers of people (Sutton and Kolja 1960a, 1960b).

III. COMPARISON AND CRITICISM.

As has been seen in their conceptions of the community, all of the writers discussed earlier seem to agree that a community is a real entity. The position of Kimball and Pearsall or Sutton and Kolaja is rather explicit while Kaufman's viewpoint is implicitly presented in his definition of the community. However, even if they conceive of the community as a real thing, each of the writers seem to imply a somewhat different connotation about the essence of the entity. Kimball and Pearsall or Kaufman seem to think of the community as a real entity which exists in its own way whether it is perceived and identified by the observer or not. Thus for them, the community is an entity which can be separated from individuals or their interaction. The community is a holistic entity of which individuals, various groups or associations are component parts. In contrast to this, Sutton and Kolaja's viewpoint seems to be slightly

different. That is, according to these authors, "the" community comes into being when interactions become patterned or regularized enough to be an *identifiable* entity. Thus, the community is not a fixed entity, but rather a flexible reality which can only be identified in its process. Put another way, according to Sutton and Kolaja, the community is always either becoming an entity or declining as an entity. As a social entity, the community may exist or not and may come and go. The emphasis is placed on the fact that the basic reality is process and within this process, an entity may sometimes be identified and is real but, on the other hand, sometimes may not be found and would be, in effect, non-existent.

This distinction becomes clearer in connection with the next question of whether the community is a dependent variable or an independent variable. For this question, Kimball and Pearsall's position is somehow ambiguous and inconsistent. Kimball and Pearsall argue that, on the one hand, community exists when there are interactions and on the other hand the pattern of each or most interaction is decided by the established customs, beliefs and value system. Hence, the authors seem to define community as an independent entity (or social system) which determines the pattern of interactions while they emphasize interactional approach as a method to search for the community system.

In Kaufman's (1959) writing, too, it is clearly stated that community action is a dependent variable which is directed by the community field as a whole and, more specifically, by patterns of demographic, ecological and physical factors as the important independent variables. While it is true that the "players and plays" in the field are influenced by these outside factors, it is an overemphasis to claim that community actions or human interactions are solely dependent variables. It should be noted that Kaufman holds the community is formed by human beings and that the goals of the community are the goals of local participants rather than goals of the field itself. Furthermore, the community development design or program, which Kaufman (1959, 1961) is concerned within his writings, is made to guide community action in order to formulate a "better" community. In this case by definition the improvement of a local society is clearly a dependent variable which is directed by the collective action. This is clear when one considers the fact that the development design or program is made by men, perhaps including Kaufman himself. In fact Kaufman explicitly states, "in the present world with many forces destroying locality identity, much community action is oriented toward *creating* community." (1959, p. 15, my italics). Hence, Kaufman's position is also controversial in regard to the problem of which is the independent or dependent variable between the community and the action.

In contrast to the previous writers, Sutton and Kolaja's position concerning this question is very explicit and clear. For these authors,

the community exists when the identifiable community phenomena occur and manifest a certain pattern in a locality. The community "comes into being" when social interactions are patterned and regularized. Thus the authors consistently imply throughout their paper that the community is a dependent variable and a consequence of human interactions.

Thus, some of the authors who use the interaction approach assume that the community as a separate entity affects the individuals' behavior and is therefore an independent variable and some others imply that community or social phenomena become an entity which is therefore a consequence of human behavior and a dependent variable. While apparently both of the assumptions seem to be sound and each of the theories has its own significance, it should be noted that the question of which is an independent or a dependent variable rests itself on an assumption that the social fact or in this case the community—and individuals' interactions, can be separated, at least in an analytical sense, as separate entities. In this regard, a question should be raised as to whether this separability of the society and the individual is logically sound or not before we ask which causes which.

Two recent publications emphasize that society, and by implication customs, beliefs and value systems, emerge at the moment human behavior becomes patterned and regularized. Warriner (1970), argues in his book, *The Emergence of Society*, "...the relationship between man and society is one of interactive interdependence," and "neither the human being nor society exist independent of the other." Nisbet (1970) also addresses this subject of the inseparability of society and human interaction by arguing that any distinction between man and society is based on a false premise. Nisbet insists that not even Durkheim believed that society was something which could be detached from concrete human beings in interaction and accordingly he cites Durkheim's own statement as follows:

If we should withdraw from men their language, sciences, arts, and moral beliefs, they would drop to the level of animals. The characteristic attributes of human nature come from society. But on the other hand, society exists and lives only in and through individuals. If the idea of society were extinguished in the individual mind, and the beliefs, traditions, and aspirations of the group were no longer felt and shared by individuals, society would die. (Nisbet 1970, p.x)

Seemingly, if one accepts the inseparability of the society and man and claims that the society is not a separate entity, it may sound meaningless to argue which is a causal or dependent factor between the society and man. In this case neither one is a causal nor a consequent variable simply because they are two sides of the same coin. Nevertheless, Nisbet (1970, p. 49) argues that each of these two sides has "its own *conceptual*

reality.” He states that to insist upon the inseparability of man and society is not to claim that society is reducible to supposedly underlying psychological forces within human beings or to physiological or chemical forces. Society has its own distinct characteristics which are irreducible to a simple human individual’s psychological or physiological forces. In brief, according to Nisbet, each has its own unique reality at least on the *conceptual* level. Thus, it can be argued that society and man are separable on the conceptual (or analytical) level.

However, it should be noted that there is an important difference between Durkheim’s viewpoint and Nisbet’s position. While Nisbet and Durkheim both believe in the inevitable interdependence between society and man, the writer suspects that Durkheim did not deny the independent “entity-ness” of both the society and the individual. A slogan reflecting this assumption is the statement, attributed to Durkheim (1964, p. 13), that “a social fact is every way of acting, fixed or not, capable of exercising on the individual an external constraint, or again, every way of acting which is general throughout a given society, while at the same time exercising its own right independent of its individual manifestation.”

In contrast to this, Nisbet’s position is quite different. According to him, the individual and society are not separated and society is not something “out there,” autonomous, substantive and separable from the actions of human beings. Put another way, for Nisbet, society, or the “social bond,” is not an independent entity, whereas for Durkheim society is an independent emergent entity. For Nisbet, society has only conceptual reality whereas for Durkheim, it is a real entity. Thus, one can recognize the basic difference in their philosophical assumptions. Nisbet’s position is based on conceptualism and Durkheim’s viewpoint is social realism. In this sense, the writer suspects that Nisbet’s interpretation of the Durkheimian theory is incorrect.³

Among the interactional theorists previously discussed, Sutton and Kolaja’s position seems to be close to Durkheim’s viewpoint in that the community is conceptualized as a real entity, while they are in agreement with Nisbet and Warriner’s viewpoint that society emerges as a reality when human interaction is patterned and regularized.

For the question of the component parts of the community, Kimball and Pearsall identify three elements. However, these three elements are not significant, viewed from the interactional perspective, in the sense that they are simply structural components of the community as a system. In other words, the authors emphasize ordered relations, customs, and the

³Durkheim’s social realism seems to be based on a dualistic viewpoint just as philosophical realism is also based on the assumption of dualism. Thus, Durkheim may believe that society and the individual are two different, distinct entities, which he assumes are closely related and interdependent, such as the relationship between the body and the mind.

system of value rather than interaction itself or actors who participate in the collective action. In contrast to this, Kaufman's and Sutton and Kolaja's concept stresses more or less the actors as well as interaction in the process of community goal achievement as important components.

Kaufman and Sutton and Kolaja agree that the community is conceptualized in terms of (1) an area or a territorial space (a relatively small one), (2) a way of life (or problem solving in connection with collective goals), and (3) collective action (Kaufman) or collective identification in action (Sutton and Kolaja). Furthermore, they all suggest somewhat similar elements as crucial variables in their interactional model for the study of the community.

First of all, they indicate the actors or participants and recipients as crucial variables.⁴ Secondly, Sutton and Kolaja point out explicitly the collective goal as an important element while Kaufman implies the collective goal as an element too.⁵ Finally, Kaufman discusses the associations or groups as an element, while Sutton and Kolaja seem to imply that the associations or groups are included in the category of actors.

However, there is an explicit difference in the conceptual components in their model of the interactional approach. Kaufman points out the stages or phases of action through time as a crucial element. In comparison, Sutton and Kolaja indicate awareness of action as a significant component part. Kaufman suggests five phases in a community action, (1) rise of interest and awareness of need, (2) the organization and maintenance of sponsorship, (3) the goal setting and the determination of specific means, (4) gaining and maintaining participation, and (5) carrying out the collective activities for the goal achievement. However, Kaufman does not clarify whether these five phases are unique in community action or common in all other levels of action.

Sutton and Kolaja's "awareness of action" is very significant for their conceptual model of the community and community action. That is the element of "awareness of action" takes an important role in differentiating the community action from non-community action. According to Sutton and Kolaja, community interactions involve a number of actors who are, to some extent, aware of their collective actions relevant to the locality. Furthermore, community actions should be based on the collective goal as distinguished from a private goal and these actions have direct effects upon many of the community members. In this way, Sutton and Kolaja delineate between community action and non-community action by using four elements in their interactional model of the community.

⁴Whereas, Sutton and Kolaja separate the actors and the recipients, Kaufman includes "beneficiaries" in the concept of participants. See Kaufman, 1959: 14, footnote no. 33.

⁵Kaufman includes goal setting in the element of phases or stages of collective action.

In comparison to Sutton and Kolaja, Kaufman did not succeed in specifying the "distinctiveness" of the community as he labels it. Kaufman suggests several criteria by which community action is said to be discriminated from non-community action. He discusses the range of interests, identification with locality and degree of involvement in the community action. Nevertheless, Kaufman does not specify the range of interests or degree of involvement except in its relation to the locality. Furthermore, while he argues that actions in the community are not community actions unless they have local reference, he fails to clarify what is local reference. As a matter of fact, Kaufman (1959, p. 15) asserts that many activities carried on in localities today have little or no reference to the locality, but instead are oriented toward the mass society and he claims, "community in the present-day world is always more a dream, an ideal, than a reality."

IV. CONCLUSION

At this time it appears that, even among sociologists who were assumed, in a broad sense, to take the interactional approach in the study of community, it is difficult to find a complete consensus in their basic positions and assumptions about community phenomena. While all of them agree that the community is a real entity in its own right, there is no agreement as to the problem of which is an independent or a dependent variable between the community and human interaction. In this regard, it is not easy to decide whose theory is more validly interactional among these authors. One way to solve this problem may be sought by first finding out what "interaction theory" means.

The origin of the "interaction theory" may be found in Weber's classic "theory of action" which was expanded by Parsons (1949), and secondly in symbolic interaction theory, which may be traced to the works of Mead (1934) and Cooley (1902), but finds more recent expression in the writings of Blumer (1962), Duncan (1969), and Warriner (1970). Both of these models conceive the actions of individuals to be more or less independent of structural determinism and can thus be considered together.

As Bertrand (1972) argues, the crux of interaction theory is found in the fact that "an actor does not behave in a predeterminable way, even though his actions are purposeful and voluntaristic. Rather, an actor takes an action based on his own interpretations and implications which he derives from the actions of others and from his own 'definition of situation'," meaning the situation where the actor is located. Viewing human interaction in this manner, social groups, organizations, communities, as well as community phenomena are the end-products of the patterns of human interaction in which individuals participate in order

to achieve goals. Thus, interaction theory views interaction itself as the basic process from which community arises.

Viewed in this way, Kimball and Pearsall's and Kaufman's positions are only partly interactional in nature. As it has been pointed out, Kimball and Pearsall were mainly concerned with methodological devices to study community phenomena, while their theoretical orientation seems to be based on the structural, functional theory. Thus, they stress more or less the concept of the relations, customs, and value systems rather than interaction itself.

Similarly, strictly speaking, Kaufman's position differs from interaction theory in the sense that he emphasizes exogenous factors as causal variables affecting human interaction. Thus, his theory is close to the ecological theory that views the physical environment as an important factor for shaping human behavior.

In a narrow sense, Sutton and Kolaja's ideas seem to fit the "model" interaction theory most closely. As has been repeatedly said, Sutton and Kolaja view community as a social structure, or group, or as a social system shaped by human interaction. Furthermore, their conceptual elements in the definition of the community denote explicitly how the community should be conceptualized and studied from the interaction approach. For example, one learns "awareness" is the key concept which Weber stressed as one of the most fundamental elements in the theory of action.

Finally it should be noted that the writer's sketches of several writers models are interpretative, since the underlying assumptions and basic positions of the writers are not always presented explicitly in their writings, but must be reconstructed from what is implicit in their work.

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