영국의 농정변화와 농정추진체계 조사 연구

Abstract

The Korea Rural Economic Institute has conducted a research "An Approach to Advanced Agricultural Policy toward the Open Economy ?Strategy and Task for It". The purpose of it is to outline an agricultural policy for the future (10 to 20 years) as Korea becomes a developed country where incomes are much higher than now and the market is fully opened. As a part of the research process, KREI want to examineagricultural policy systems (complex) in advanced countries, including the decision making process, related institutions or organizations, and their activities. Overseas experts are to write reports about agricultural policy process in their countriesand this report is about the UK. These will be used as a reference for making theKorean agricultural policy process more desired and advanced. The purpose of the study is to provide a good understanding of agricultural policy making process in the UKas well as in EU, and to provide a good understanding of whole agricultural policy complex in the UK (organizations, institutions, or groups) in the past and now. The evolution of the United Kingdom’s agricultural policy is potentiallyinstructive for developing countries such as Korea. The treatment of the declining sectors ? especially agriculture ?is a critical issue in the process of development, since the economic signals of development are declining incomes in the declining sectors, such as agriculture.The UK’s modern agricultural policy began with the 1947 Agriculture Act, which sought to encourage domestic production following a period of food insecurity during WWII and also to provide some stability to the agricultural sector to assist with the transition to a peacetime economy. Respecting important commonwealth and ally trade relations, the UK chose guaranteed prices and deficiency payments as the appropriate instruments of support, at the taxpayers’expense. The UK, in acceding to the CAP, completed by 1979, had substituted a farm support policy funded by taxpayers for one funded by consumers, and had also joined a club where the common costs of the policy were born collectively under the common financing principle. As a result, the UK suffered a net transfer of funds to the rest of the EU, especially to France as a major net agricultural exporter. The consequent frictions coloured EU relations for some time, especially as the EU reverted towards a common net export position in response to continued high support prices relative to the rest of the world ?necessitating export subsidies to third countries rather than the original import levies, with consequent increasing budgetary costs for the EU. In 2007, the EU began a ‘health check’on the 2003 CAP reforms, to seek agreement on the continued development of the policy, and including endorsement of the planned elimination of dairy quotas (and most associated support mechanisms, with the exception of some remaining import levies on dairy products) in 2015, and also further modulation, simplification and decoupling of the single farm payments (SFPs, also known as the SPS ? Single Payment System As is to be expected, a wide range of interest groups and stakeholders seek to have an influence on both the European Commission (in its drafting of policy proposals and conduct of reviews) and the Council of Ministers in their ultimate decisions on farm policy in the EU. The farmers, represented in the EU by Copa/Cogeca ? "the united voice of farmers and their cooperatives in the European union" - is the umbrella organization for farmers’unions in the member states, is clearly a major stakeholder, and has been since the inception of the CAP. However, farmers have never held a formal (legislated) position in the EU policy process, as did the UK’s National Farmers’Union (NFU) under the British 1947 Agriculture Act. In fact, it is likely, though difficult to document, that farmers exert their major influence on EU policy direction via their ownnational organisations (such as the NFU) and their domestic influence on their own member state governments, which in turn influence the Commission in its proposals ? since the Commission gains little by proposing policies or changes which do not have at least some chance of eventual acceptance by the Council. There are now several agencies in the UK charged with implementing the CAP. The first of these is the Rural Payments Agency, which is responsible for the CAP payment functions formerly delivered by the Defra Paying Agency and the Intervention Board, primarily responsible for the Single Farm Payments in England. The delivery of SFPs elsewhere in the UK is now devolved to the National Assembly for Wales, the Scottish Government and the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development, Northern Ireland, as are the other policy delivery mechanisms associated with CAP payments for environmental protection and rural development. As far as the latter (rural development) is concerned, which is increasingly taking over from the traditional CAP instruments for delivery of policy objectives through the rural development share of the modulation of the Single Farm Payments, the position is even more complicated, since devolution has also been applied within England to 9 Regional Development Agencies(RDAs), though the overall direction is provided centrally for England under the Rural Development Programme, England(RDPE). This programme, and its regional implementation counterparts, is still in its infancy so it is too early to tell how it will actually happen and what effects it will have. However, there is room to doubt the present capacity of the RDAs and their consultation or advisory systems for the design and implementation of effective rural development programmes. Each of these delivery agencies’ performance is subject to audit both by the UK Audit Office, and by the European Court of Auditors, which produce periodic reports on the efficiency and effectiveness of the programmes. In addition, and importantly, asthe previous outline indicates, the policy and its programme elements are subject to continual debate and criticism by the stakeholders and their organisations, both at national and EU level, formalized in many cases by formal investigation by national and European parliaments. This continual scrutiny and assessment provides the background against which the Commission develops ideas and proposals for future development of the policy (including its funding through the European budget and its relations with member state exchequers), and also colours member state responses to these proposals. In short, there is an ongoing complex process of continual criticism and proposed changes and developments throughout the EU, involving local, regional, national and European parliaments and all the associated pressure groups and interested stakeholders, from which emerge adaptations and innovations in policy to better meet the needs and aspirations of European Society. As is also indicated in the previous outline, these developments have also to respond to and fit with international agreements (especially the WTO), and conditions in world markets. The CAP faces major challenges in the future. It is far from clear that a uniform ‘common’ policy is any longer well suited to meet the needs of 27 very different member states, while being increasingly targeted to meet environmental and rural development issues and, constrained by both internal logic and domestic political pressure as well as by international agreements (existingand prospective) under the WTO, increasingly required to open up agricultural markets to free(r) trade with the rest of the world. On the other hand, with an expected continuation of the present high price of oil, and hence of transport, coupled with increased differentiation and segmentation of food markets and the growth of consumer demands for local and ‘original’food products, domestic production issues cannot be expected to disappear, albeit that the market rather than government policy will likely be expected to resolve them. Of particular relevance to Korea is the extent to which the present and likely future CAP and associated policies prove well suited to the New Member States (such as Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary). These countries are currently in a similar state of economic development to Korea, and are faced with the serious difficulty of designing and implementing rural development and declining sector support systems which are consistent with a Single (open) Market and emerging WTO governed international free trade in farm products. The rural development and environmental policies (which largely replace the previous levels of coupled agricultural support in the developed Member States) are still under-developed and possibly ill-suited to the needs of these developing member states, and are subject to heavy prescription and limited funding from the EU (perhaps in much the same way as international agreements constrain Korean policy development). The cohesion of the EU, and hence the power and influence of the Union, if not also its economic prosperity, depends on these developing member states being able to grow faster than the more developed members. The adjustments required in their domestic economies, as they move from being predominantlyagrarian to largely industrial/commercial, are substantial, and the design and implementation of policies suited to assist and ease the transition are vital to the EU. It is not clear that this fundamental issue is yet being addressed within the EU. Failure to do so compromises the whole European experiment.