CONTRACTUAL CHANGE AND SELF-REINFORCING GOVERNANCE: LESSONS FROM POST-SOCIALIST TRANSITION FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORM POLICIES
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영문 제목
- CONTRACTUAL CHANGE AND SELF-REINFORCING GOVERNANCE: LESSONS FROM POST-SOCIALIST TRANSITION FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORM POLICIES
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저자
- Markus Brem; 김경량
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출판년도
- 2004-03
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목차
- ContentsⅠ. IntroductionⅡ. Firm Restructuring in Agricultural TransitionⅢ. The Czech CaseⅣ. Discussion and PerspectivesⅤ. Lessons for a Possible Transition on the Korean PeninsulaABSTRACTThis paper focuses on firm restructuring in transition countries by suggesting mechanisms of governance change that can lead to self-reinforcing contracts. The urn-function model, by linking history, policy, and the relative governance share in a business sector, seeks to support the explanation of the stability of large-scale agriculture. Applied to agricultural restructuring, network externalities in governance structures and increasing transactional returns resulting socialist farming may cause the stability of large-scale farm organizations during transition, eventhough family farming is often expected to be more efficientaccording to transaction costs arguments. Some empirical evidence comes from the Czech case of post-socialist transition. Finally we try to draw out the lessons for a possible transition on the korean peninsula.
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발행처
- Harvard Law School
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주제어
- Transition; Transaction; Self-reinforcement; Network Externalities; Czech Agriculture; Korean Peninsula; Transition; Transaction; Self-reinforcement; Network Externalities; Czech Agriculture; Korean Peninsula
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발간물 유형
- KREI 논문
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URI
- http://repository.krei.re.kr/handle/2018.oak/17994
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Appears in Collections:
- 학술지 논문 > 농촌경제 / JRD
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