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dc.contributor.author임정빈-
dc.date.accessioned2018-11-15T08:28:34Z-
dc.date.available2018-11-15T08:28:34Z-
dc.date.issued2000-08-
dc.identifier.otherJRD23-1-01-
dc.identifier.urihttp://repository.krei.re.kr/handle/2018.oak/15916-
dc.description.tableofcontentsCONTENTSI. IntroductionII. Welfare Measures of the Interest GroupsIII. Comparison between Economic Efficiency and Political FeasibilityIV. Sensitivity AnalysisV. Summary and Policy ImplicationsABSTRACTThe normative use of the Political preference function may provide usefulinsights to policymakers and economists. Particularly, when the governmentattaches different weights to producers, consumers and taxpayers, the optimalchoice among alternative policies depends on the particular political (orwelfare) preferences and is an empirical question. Thus, this paper has employedthe implicit political preference function to analyze the trade-off betweeneconomic efficiency and political feasibility among alternative rice policies inKorea. Specifically, in this paper, we demonstrate the trade-off betweeneconomic efficiency and political feasibility among five alternative policyinstruments.-
dc.publisherKREI-
dc.titleOPTIMAL POLICY REFORMS WITH ON IMPLICIT POLITICAL PREFERENCE:THE CASE OF RICE IN KOREA-
dc.title.alternativeOPTIMAL POLICY REFORMS WITH ON IMPLICIT POLITICAL PREFERENCE:THE CASE OF RICE IN KOREA-
dc.typeKREI 논문-
dc.contributor.alternativeNameLim, Jeongbin-
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학술지 논문 > 농촌경제 / JRD
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