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dc.contributor.author임정빈-
dc.date.accessioned2018-11-15T08:28:34Z-
dc.date.available2018-11-15T08:28:34Z-
dc.date.issued2000-08-
dc.identifier.otherJRD23-1-01-
dc.identifier.urihttp://repository.krei.re.kr/handle/2018.oak/15916-
dc.description.tableofcontentsCONTENTS I. Introduction II. Welfare Measures of the Interest Groups III. Comparison between Economic Efficiency and Political Feasibility IV. Sensitivity Analysis V. Summary and Policy Implications ABSTRACT The normative use of the Political preference function may provide useful insights to policymakers and economists. Particularly, when the government attaches different weights to producers, consumers and taxpayers, the optimal choice among alternative policies depends on the particular political (or welfare) preferences and is an empirical question. Thus, this paper has employed the implicit political preference function to analyze the trade-off between economic efficiency and political feasibility among alternative rice policies in Korea. Specifically, in this paper, we demonstrate the trade-off between economic efficiency and political feasibility among five alternative policy instruments.-
dc.publisherKREI-
dc.titleOPTIMAL POLICY REFORMS WITH ON IMPLICIT POLITICAL PREFERENCE:THE CASE OF RICE IN KOREA-
dc.title.alternativeOPTIMAL POLICY REFORMS WITH ON IMPLICIT POLITICAL PREFERENCE:THE CASE OF RICE IN KOREA-
dc.typeKREI 논문-
dc.contributor.alternativeNameLim, Jeongbin-
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학술지 논문 > 농촌경제 / JRD
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