KREI Repository: CONTRACTUAL CHANGE AND SELF-REINFORCING GOVERNANCE: LESSONS FROM POST-SOCIALIST TRANSITION FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORM POLICIES

CONTRACTUAL CHANGE AND SELF-REINFORCING GOVERNANCE: LESSONS FROM POST-SOCIALIST TRANSITION FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORM POLICIES

영문 제목: CONTRACTUAL CHANGE AND SELF-REINFORCING GOVERNANCE: LESSONS FROM POST-SOCIALIST TRANSITION FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORM POLICIES

목차: ContentsⅠ. IntroductionⅡ. Firm Restructuring in Agricultural TransitionⅢ. The Czech CaseⅣ. Discussion and PerspectivesⅤ. Lessons for a Possible Transition on the Korean PeninsulaABSTRACTThis paper focuses on firm restructuring in transition countries by suggesting mechanisms of governance change that can lead to self-reinforcing contracts. The urn-function model, by linking history, policy, and the relative governance share in a business sector, seeks to support the explanation of the stability of large-scale agriculture. Applied to agricultural restructuring, network externalities in governance structures and increasing transactional returns resulting socialist farming may cause the stability of large-scale farm organizations during transition, eventhough family farming is often expected to be more efficientaccording to transaction costs arguments. Some empirical evidence comes from the Czech case of post-socialist transition. Finally we try to draw out the lessons for a possible transition on the korean peninsula.

주제어: Transition; Transaction; Self-reinforcement; Network Externalities; Czech Agriculture; Korean Peninsula; Transition; Transaction; Self-reinforcement; Network Externalities; Czech Agriculture; Korean Peninsula

Files in This Item:: CONTRACTUAL CHANGE AND SELF-REINFORCING GOVERNANCE: LESSONS FROM POST-SOCIALIST TRANSITION FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORM POLICIES.pdf (287.82 kB) Download

qrcode

Korea Rural Economic Institue